en Calude, C.S Randomness and Complexity. From Leibniz to Chaitin World Scientific, Singapore, 2007

In order to examine some philosophical consequences of Gregory Chaitin’s quest for this paper comes in five sections. First of all (first section), I consider Chaitin’s interpretation of Leibniz’s thought and how Chaitin’s halting probability invalidates Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. Then (second section), I compare this analysis with a classic reading of Leibniz, namely what Heidegger states in The Principle of Reason. Once we have grasped Heidegger’s criticism to the principle nihil est sine ratione (section 3), I will stress some paramount differences between Heidegger’s thesis and Chaitin’s theorems (section 4). By showing some flaws in the German scholar’s viewpoint, what I would like to lay emphasis on is the impact of Chaitin’s results in contemporary philosophical debate (section 5).