Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacher, John Searle
Columbia University Press, 2009

In Neuroscience and Philosophy three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond.

Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness.

In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University) explains why this confrontation is so crucial to the understanding of neuroscientific research. The project of cognitive neuroscience, he asserts, depends on the incorporation of human nature into the framework of science itself. In Robinson's estimation, Dennett and Searle fail to support this undertaking; Bennett and Hacker suggest that the project itself might be based on a conceptual mistake. Exciting and challenging, Neuroscience and Philosophy is an exceptional introduction to the philosophical problems raised by cognitive neuroscience.

Peter Simons
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987

Algunos argumentos usados en los campos de la economía o de la neurociencia han sido tachados como falacias mereológicas por confundir el todo con la parte. Monserrat Bordes ¹⁾ pone un ejemplo cuando en economía se extrapolan las observaciones del ámbito microeconómico al macroeconómico al afirmar que la economía de una nación es como la economía de una casa o de una familia ²⁾. Peter Hacker y Maxwell Bennett ³⁾ apuntan a la falacia mereológica en neurociencia cuando asumen que es el cerebro el que tiene las capacidades cognitivas, cogitativas, perceptuales y volitivas que son propias de los seres humanos. El libro de Peter Simons muestra que la mereología, es decir, la teoría formal sobre las partes y el todo, es fundamental para elaborar una correcta ontología.