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--- proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:stewart2010 [2017/11/15 10:10]
Joaquín Herrero Pintado
+++ proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:stewart2010 [2017/11/15 10:11] (actual)
Joaquín Herrero Pintado [Stewart, J. et al, Enaction. Toward a New Paradigm in Cognitive Science (2010)]
@@ Línea 1: / Línea 1: @@
 ====== Stewart, J. et al, Enaction. Toward a New Paradigm in Cognitive Science (2010) ======
+The aim of this book is to present the paradigm of enaction as a framework
+for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science as a whole. 1 There have been
+many critiques of classical, first-generation cognitivism based on the Computational
+Theory of Mind. A distinctive feature of this book is a deliberate
+choice not to go over that old ground yet again, but to reserve the energy
+for positive exploration of new paths.
+Enaction, initially articulated as a program for understanding cognition
+by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), has seen an explosion of
+activity in recent years, including a follow-up book investigating the
+deeper connections between life and mind (Thompson 2007), related
+special journal issues (Barandiaran and Ruiz-Mirazo 2008; Di Paolo 2009;
+Rohde and Ikegami 2009; Torrance 2005, 2007), many articles reporting
+on theoretical and empirical advances and several regular meetings,
+summer schools, and funded projects. This program makes a radical break
+with the formalisms of information-processing and symbolic representations
+prevalent in cognitive science. In their stead, as explained in the
+fi rst text, by John Stewart, cognition is grounded in the sensorimotor
+dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment.
+In the classical scheme, perception is relegated to a preliminary
+“ module ” based on sensory input alone, to be followed in a linear sequence
+by “ cognitive ” planning and representations of goals, and culminating
+in a decision to act. In this scheme, “ cognition ” is thus sandwiched
+between two layers — sensory input and motor output — which are not
+themselves considered as properly cognitive. The perspective of enaction
+overturns this scheme quite radically. A living organism enacts the world
+it lives in; its effective, embodied action in the world actually constitutes
+its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. The text by Renaud
+Barbaras takes as its springboard the observation that “ to live ” is to have
+intentional conscious experience of living, and engages a profound
+phenomenological analysis of the implications, including the relation
+between life and metabolism.
+===== Índice =====
 Introduction vii \\

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