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--- proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:collier2011 [2017/10/27 09:02] – editor externo 127.0.0.1
+++ proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:collier2011 [2017/11/15 10:24] (actual) – Joaquín Herrero Pintado
@@ Línea 1: / Línea 1: @@
-====== Collier, J., 2011, Information, Causation and Computation ======
+====== Collier, J.D., Information, Causation and Computation (2011) ======
 en Information and Computation. Essays on Scientific and Philosophical Understanding of Foundations os Information and Computation, World Scientific, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic, Mark Burgin (ed.)
+Disponible online: [[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296183475_INFORMATION_CAUSATION_AND_COMPUTATION|researchgate.net]]
+I make two basic assumptions. First, all information takes a physical form, and second, that
+everything that is real is dynamical or can be explained in dynamical terms. Something is dynamical
+only if it involves nothing but forces and flows. It follows that information must be explicable in
+terms of forces and flows. At first this is counterintuitive, since information is typically thought of as
+a cognitive, computational or logical notion. However it is possible to bring logic and causation
+together through a specific analysis if the logic of information flow and a reasonable definition of
+what it is to make a physical difference, given that information is well characterized as "a distinction
+that makes a difference" (MacKay 1969), or "a difference that makes a difference" (Bateson 1973:
+). Information theory, then, is fundamentally the rigorous study of distinctions and their relations,
+inasmuch as they make a difference. The physicalist assumption implies that these distinctions are
+physical, and the dynamical assumption implies that they make a difference to forces and/or flows.
+By bringing together causation (which makes a dynamical difference) with the logic of information
+flow, it becomes possible to see causation as a sort of computation.