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====== Stewart, J. et al, Enaction. Toward a New Paradigm in Cognitive Science (2010) ======

The aim of this book is to present the paradigm of enaction as a framework
for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science as a whole. 1 There have been
many critiques of classical, first-generation cognitivism based on the Computational
Theory of Mind. A distinctive feature of this book is a deliberate
choice not to go over that old ground yet again, but to reserve the energy
for positive exploration of new paths.

Enaction, initially articulated as a program for understanding cognition
by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), has seen an explosion of
activity in recent years, including a follow-up book investigating the
deeper connections between life and mind (Thompson 2007), related
special journal issues (Barandiaran and Ruiz-Mirazo 2008; Di Paolo 2009;
Rohde and Ikegami 2009; Torrance 2005, 2007), many articles reporting
on theoretical and empirical advances and several regular meetings,
summer schools, and funded projects. This program makes a radical break
with the formalisms of information-processing and symbolic representations
prevalent in cognitive science. In their stead, as explained in the
fi rst text, by John Stewart, cognition is grounded in the sensorimotor
dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment.
In the classical scheme, perception is relegated to a preliminary
“ module ” based on sensory input alone, to be followed in a linear sequence
by “ cognitive ” planning and representations of goals, and culminating
in a decision to act. In this scheme, “ cognition ” is thus sandwiched
between two layers — sensory input and motor output — which are not
themselves considered as properly cognitive. The perspective of enaction
overturns this scheme quite radically. A living organism enacts the world
it lives in; its effective, embodied action in the world actually constitutes
its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. The text by Renaud
Barbaras takes as its springboard the observation that “ to live ” is to have
intentional conscious experience of living, and engages a profound
phenomenological analysis of the implications, including the relation
between life and metabolism.

===== Índice =====

Introduction vii \\
John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo

1 Foundational Issues in Enaction as a Paradigm for Cognitive Science : From the Origin of Life to Consciousness and Writing \\
John Stewart

2 Horizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play \\
Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Marieke Rohde, and Hanne De Jaegher

3 Life and Exteriority : The Problem of Metabolism \\
Renaud Barbaras

4 Development through Sensorimotor Coordination \\
Adam Sheya and Linda B. Smith

5 Enaction, Sense-Making, and Emotion \\
Giovanna Colombetti

6 Thinking in Movement: Further Analyses and Validations \\
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone

7 Kinesthesia and the Construction of Perceptual Objects \\
Olivier Gapenne

8 Directive Minds: How Dynamics Shapes Cognition \\
Andreas K. Engel

9 Neurodynamics and Phenomenology in Mutual Enlightenment: The Example of the Epileptic Aura \\
Michel Le Van Quyen

10 Language and Enaction \\
Didier Bottineau

11 Enacting Infinity: Bringing Transfi nite Cardinals into Being \\
Rafael E. Núñez

12 The Ontological Constitution of Cognition and the Epistemological Constitution of Cognitive Science: Phenomenology, Enaction, and Technology \\
Véronique Havelange

13 Embodiment or Envatment?: Reflections on the Bodily Basis of Consciousness \\
Diego Cosmelli and Evan Thompson

14 Toward a Phenomenological Psychology of the Conscious \\
Benny Shanon

15 Enaction, Imagination, and Insight \\
Edwin Hutchins
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