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Traza: • Crítica del Juicio • Wikiproyecto: Ciencia, Tecnología y Género • PEC 1: El interior de la casa como objeto cultural • Ulrich Beck • Amartya Sen • Filosofía de la biología • Braver, L., A Thing of This World. A history of Continental Anti-Realism. (2007) • Filosofía y Medicina • Entrevista con Stephen Riggins, 1982 • Joel Mokyr
proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:meillassoux2011

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proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:meillassoux2011 [2017/11/22 19:07] – creado Joaquín Herrero Pintadoproyectos:tfg:bibliografia:meillassoux2011 [2017/11/22 19:08] (actual) – Joaquín Herrero Pintado
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 problem of grounding causal connections. Against its progressive abandonment as an problem of grounding causal connections. Against its progressive abandonment as an
 ontological problem, Meillassoux asserts the possibility of taking Hume’s problem as an ontological problem, Meillassoux asserts the possibility of taking Hume’s problem as an
-ontological question amenable to resolution. Meillassoux begins by reformulating Hu- +ontological question amenable to resolution. Meillassoux begins by reformulating Hume’s problem in a more general manner: ‘can a decisive conclusion be made as to the
-me’s problem in a more general manner: ‘can a decisive conclusion be made as to the+
 necessity or lack of necessity of observed constants? ’ A lack of necessity would not en- necessity or lack of necessity of observed constants? ’ A lack of necessity would not en-
 tail that constants change, but rather that it is entirely contingent whether they stay the tail that constants change, but rather that it is entirely contingent whether they stay the
-same or not. Once such a lack of necessity has been accepted, the question of wheth- +same or not. Once such a lack of necessity has been accepted, the question of whether phenomenal laws will remain the same or not falls to the side. A different question
-er phenomenal laws will remain the same or not falls to the side. A different question+
 rises in its place: if there are no necessary relations between observable instants, then rises in its place: if there are no necessary relations between observable instants, then
 why do phenomenal constants not change at every moment? Meillassoux argues that why do phenomenal constants not change at every moment? Meillassoux argues that
 this apparent paradox is contingent upon the acceptance of a probabilistic reasoning this apparent paradox is contingent upon the acceptance of a probabilistic reasoning
-about the universe as a whole. This probabilistic reasoning is based upon the totaliza- +about the universe as a whole. This probabilistic reasoning is based upon the totalization of the world of possibilities: the range of potentials which can then be assigned a
-tion of the world of possibilities: the range of potentials which can then be assigned a+
 probability of occurring. Yet if this totalization is impossible, as Cantor’s discovery of probability of occurring. Yet if this totalization is impossible, as Cantor’s discovery of
-multiple infinities suggests, then there is no basis for ascribing probabilities to any phe- +multiple infinities suggests, then there is no basis for ascribing probabilities to any phenomenal event on the level of the universe. It is on the basis of this Cantorian advance 
-nomenal event on the level of the universe. It is on the basis of this Cantorian advance +that Meillassoux sets forth a fundamental distinction between potentiality and virtuality. Whereas the former is premised upon a totalization of the world, with a determinate set of possibilities inscribed within it, the latter rejects this totalization and asserts
-that Meillassoux sets forth a fundamental distinction between potentiality and virtual- +
-ity. Whereas the former is premised upon a totalization of the world, with a determi- +
-nate set of possibilities inscribed within it, the latter rejects this totalization and asserts+
 the fundamental novelty that is able to emerge beyond any pre-constituted totality. the fundamental novelty that is able to emerge beyond any pre-constituted totality.
proyectos/tfg/bibliografia/meillassoux2011.1511377669.txt.gz · Última modificación: por Joaquín Herrero Pintado