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proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:collier2011 [2017/11/08 02:20] Joaquín Herrero Pintado |
proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:collier2011 [2017/11/15 10:24] (actual) Joaquín Herrero Pintado |
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- | ====== Collier, J., Information, Causation and Computation (2011) ====== | + | ====== Collier, J.D., Information, Causation and Computation (2011) ====== |
en Information and Computation. Essays on Scientific and Philosophical Understanding of Foundations os Information and Computation, World Scientific, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic, Mark Burgin (ed.) | en Information and Computation. Essays on Scientific and Philosophical Understanding of Foundations os Information and Computation, World Scientific, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic, Mark Burgin (ed.) | ||
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+ | Disponible online: [[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296183475_INFORMATION_CAUSATION_AND_COMPUTATION|researchgate.net]] | ||
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+ | I make two basic assumptions. First, all information takes a physical form, and second, that | ||
+ | everything that is real is dynamical or can be explained in dynamical terms. Something is dynamical | ||
+ | only if it involves nothing but forces and flows. It follows that information must be explicable in | ||
+ | terms of forces and flows. At first this is counterintuitive, since information is typically thought of as | ||
+ | a cognitive, computational or logical notion. However it is possible to bring logic and causation | ||
+ | together through a specific analysis if the logic of information flow and a reasonable definition of | ||
+ | what it is to make a physical difference, given that information is well characterized as "a distinction | ||
+ | that makes a difference" (MacKay 1969), or "a difference that makes a difference" (Bateson 1973: | ||
+ | 428). Information theory, then, is fundamentally the rigorous study of distinctions and their relations, | ||
+ | inasmuch as they make a difference. The physicalist assumption implies that these distinctions are | ||
+ | physical, and the dynamical assumption implies that they make a difference to forces and/or flows. | ||
+ | By bringing together causation (which makes a dynamical difference) with the logic of information | ||
+ | flow, it becomes possible to see causation as a sort of computation. |