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proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:collier2011 [2017/11/08 02:20]
Joaquín Herrero Pintado
proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:collier2011 [2017/11/15 10:24] (actual)
Joaquín Herrero Pintado
Línea 1: Línea 1:
-====== Collier, J., Information,​ Causation and Computation (2011) ======+====== Collier, J.D., Information,​ Causation and Computation (2011) ======
  
 en Information and Computation. Essays on Scientific and Philosophical Understanding of Foundations os Information and Computation,​ World Scientific, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic,​ Mark Burgin (ed.) en Information and Computation. Essays on Scientific and Philosophical Understanding of Foundations os Information and Computation,​ World Scientific, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic,​ Mark Burgin (ed.)
 +
 +
 +Disponible online: [[https://​www.researchgate.net/​publication/​296183475_INFORMATION_CAUSATION_AND_COMPUTATION|researchgate.net]]
 +
 +I make two basic assumptions. First, all information takes a physical form, and second, that
 +everything that is real is dynamical or can be explained in dynamical terms. Something is dynamical
 +only if it involves nothing but forces and flows. It follows that information must be explicable in
 +terms of forces and flows. At first this is counterintuitive,​ since information is typically thought of as
 +a cognitive, computational or logical notion. However it is possible to bring logic and causation
 +together through a specific analysis if the logic of information flow and a reasonable definition of
 +what it is to make a physical difference, given that information is well characterized as "a distinction
 +that makes a difference"​ (MacKay 1969), or "a difference that makes a difference"​ (Bateson 1973:
 +428). Information theory, then, is fundamentally the rigorous study of distinctions and their relations,
 +inasmuch as they make a difference. The physicalist assumption implies that these distinctions are
 +physical, and the dynamical assumption implies that they make a difference to forces and/or flows.
 +By bringing together causation (which makes a dynamical difference) with the logic of information
 +flow, it becomes possible to see causation as a sort of computation.
proyectos/tfg/bibliografia/collier2011.1510107617.txt.gz · Última modificación: 2017/11/08 02:20 por Joaquín Herrero Pintado