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--- proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:stotz2017 [2017/10/27 09:06]
127.0.0.1 editor externo
+++ proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:stotz2017 [2017/11/15 08:53] (actual)
Joaquín Herrero Pintado
@@ Línea 1: / Línea 1: @@
-====== Stotz, K., Biological Information, Causality, and Specificity: An Intimate Relationship ======
+====== Stotz, K., Biological Information, Causality, and Specificity: An Intimate Relationship (2017) ======
 en Imari Walker, S. (ed), 2017, From Matter to Life – Information and Causality
+The lack of a rigorous account of biological information as a proximal causal
+factor in biological systems is a striking gap in the scientific worldview. In
+this chapter we outline a proposal to fill that gap by grounding the idea of
+biological information in a contemporary philosophical account of causation.
+Biological information is a certain kind of causal relationship between
+components of living systems. Many accounts of information in the
+philosophy of biology have set out to vindicate the common assumption that
+nucleic acids are distinctively informational molecules. Here we take a more
+unprejudiced approach, developing an account of biological information and
+then seeing how widely it applies.
+In the first section, ‘Information in Biology’, we begin with the most
+prominent informational idea in modern biology – the coding relation
+between nucleic acid and protein. A deeper look at the background to Francis
+Crick’s Central Dogma, and a comparison with the distinction in
+developmental biology between permissive and instructive interactions,
+reveals that ‘information’ is a way to talk about specificity. The idea of
+specificity has a long history in biology, and a closely related idea is a key
+part of a widely supported contemporary account of causation in philosophy
+that grounds causal relationships in ideas about manipulability and control. In
+the second section, ‘Causal Specificity: An Information-Theoretic Approach’,
+we describe the idea of ‘causal specificity’ and an information-theoretic
+measure of the degree of specificity of a cause for its effect. Biological
+specificity, we suggest, is simply causal specificity in biological systems.
+Since we have already argued that ‘information’ is a way to talk about
+biological specificity, we conclude that causal relationships are
+‘informational’ simply when they are highly specific. The third section,
+‘Arbitrariness, Information, and Regulation’, defends this identification
+against the claim that only causal relationships in which the relation between
+cause and effect is ‘arbitrary’ should count as informational. Arbitrariness has
+an important role, however, in understanding the regulation of gene
+expression via gene regulatory networks. Having defended our identification
+of information with specificity, we show in the final section, ‘Distributed
+Specificity’, that information is more widely distributed in biological systems
+than is often supposed. Coding sequences of DNA are only one source of
+biological specificity, and hence only one locus of biological information.

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