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proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:meillassoux2011 [2017/11/22 19:07] Joaquín Herrero Pintado creado |
proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:meillassoux2011 [2017/11/22 19:08] (actual) Joaquín Herrero Pintado |
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| problem of grounding causal connections. Against its progressive abandonment as an | problem of grounding causal connections. Against its progressive abandonment as an | ||
| ontological problem, Meillassoux asserts the possibility of taking Hume’s problem as an | ontological problem, Meillassoux asserts the possibility of taking Hume’s problem as an | ||
| - | ontological question amenable to resolution. Meillassoux begins by reformulating Hu- | + | ontological question amenable to resolution. Meillassoux begins by reformulating Hume’s problem in a more general manner: ‘can a decisive conclusion be made as to the |
| - | me’s problem in a more general manner: ‘can a decisive conclusion be made as to the | + | |
| necessity or lack of necessity of observed constants? ’ A lack of necessity would not en- | necessity or lack of necessity of observed constants? ’ A lack of necessity would not en- | ||
| tail that constants change, but rather that it is entirely contingent whether they stay the | tail that constants change, but rather that it is entirely contingent whether they stay the | ||
| - | same or not. Once such a lack of necessity has been accepted, the question of wheth- | + | same or not. Once such a lack of necessity has been accepted, the question of whether phenomenal laws will remain the same or not falls to the side. A different question |
| - | er phenomenal laws will remain the same or not falls to the side. A different question | + | |
| rises in its place: if there are no necessary relations between observable instants, then | rises in its place: if there are no necessary relations between observable instants, then | ||
| why do phenomenal constants not change at every moment? Meillassoux argues that | why do phenomenal constants not change at every moment? Meillassoux argues that | ||
| this apparent paradox is contingent upon the acceptance of a probabilistic reasoning | this apparent paradox is contingent upon the acceptance of a probabilistic reasoning | ||
| - | about the universe as a whole. This probabilistic reasoning is based upon the totaliza- | + | about the universe as a whole. This probabilistic reasoning is based upon the totalization of the world of possibilities: the range of potentials which can then be assigned a |
| - | tion of the world of possibilities: the range of potentials which can then be assigned a | + | |
| probability of occurring. Yet if this totalization is impossible, as Cantor’s discovery of | probability of occurring. Yet if this totalization is impossible, as Cantor’s discovery of | ||
| - | multiple infinities suggests, then there is no basis for ascribing probabilities to any phe- | + | multiple infinities suggests, then there is no basis for ascribing probabilities to any phenomenal event on the level of the universe. It is on the basis of this Cantorian advance |
| - | nomenal event on the level of the universe. It is on the basis of this Cantorian advance | + | that Meillassoux sets forth a fundamental distinction between potentiality and virtuality. Whereas the former is premised upon a totalization of the world, with a determinate set of possibilities inscribed within it, the latter rejects this totalization and asserts |
| - | that Meillassoux sets forth a fundamental distinction between potentiality and virtual- | + | |
| - | ity. Whereas the former is premised upon a totalization of the world, with a determi- | + | |
| - | nate set of possibilities inscribed within it, the latter rejects this totalization and asserts | + | |
| the fundamental novelty that is able to emerge beyond any pre-constituted totality. | the fundamental novelty that is able to emerge beyond any pre-constituted totality. | ||
proyectos/tfg/bibliografia/meillassoux2011.1511377669.txt.gz · Última modificación: 2017/11/22 19:07 por Joaquín Herrero Pintado
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