Diferencias

Muestra las diferencias entre dos versiones de la página.

--- proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:braver2007 [2017/11/20 10:51]
Joaquín Herrero Pintado creado
+++ proyectos:tfg:bibliografia:braver2007 [2017/11/20 12:21] (actual)
Joaquín Herrero Pintado
@@ Línea 1: / Línea 1: @@
 ====== Braver, L., A Thing of This World. A history of Continental Anti-Realism. (2007) ======
+===== Index =====
+Introduction: The Kantian Root
+Defining Realism
+Part 1. The Kantian Paradigm
+Kant’s Revolution \\
+Hegel: The Truth of the Whole \\
+Nietzsche’s Will to Truth
+Transition
+Early Heidegger: Fundamental Ontology
+Part 2. The Heideggerian Paradigm
+Later Heidegger: “The Great Turning Around” \\
+Foucault’s History of Truth
+Post
+Derrida
+Conclusion: Anthropology from Two Kantian Points of View; or, A Tale of Two Kants
 ===== Introduction =====
@@ Línea 7: / Línea 35: @@
 branches, so philosophy was then split into rationalism and empiricism.
 Beginning from different assumptions and methods, the early modern
-schools grew farther apart as they developed. Starting from Descartes’
+schools grew farther apart as they developed. Starting from **Descartes**’
 commitment to a few absolutely certain innate ideas and reason’s ability
-to determine some facts about reality a priori, Leibniz ended up making
+to determine some facts about reality a priori, **Leibniz** ended up making
 all ideas innate and deducing how God must have set up the universe. On
-the other side, Hume continued Locke’s emptying out of the mind until
+the other side, Hume continued **Locke’s** emptying out of the mind until
 there was no longer a there there, that is, not even a substantial mind to
 be emptied. Far from being rationally justifiable, Hume demonstrated
@@ Línea 17: / Línea 45: @@
 that has roughly the epistemological status of digestion.
-Perhaps Kant’s greatest accomplishment was reconciling these deeply
+Perhaps **Kant’s** greatest accomplishment was reconciling these deeply
 heterogeneous schools, weaving a seamless system out of ideas taken from
-both sides. The linchpin of this synthesis was what he called his Copernican
+both sides. The linchpin of this synthesis was what he called his **Copernican
-Revolution: the epoch-making claim that the mind actively processes
+Revolution**: the epoch-making claim that the mind actively processes
 or organizes experience in constructing knowledge, rather than passively
 reflecting an independent reality. To speak metaphorically, the mind is
@@ Línea 36: / Línea 64: @@
 empiricists and the rationalists at least talked to each other. They read each
 other’s works and engaged in informed debate; to cite just one example,
-Leibniz chose the title //New Essays on the Understanding// as a direct response
+**Leibniz** chose the title //New Essays on the Understanding// as a direct response
-to Locke’s //Essay Concerning Human Understanding//. For much of the twentieth
+to **Locke’s** //Essay Concerning Human Understanding//. For much of the twentieth
 century, on the other hand, the level of engagement between analytic
 and continental thinkers has rarely risen above mutual disinterest, uninformed
 dismissal, or plain insult; it is hard to imagine a major figure from
 either side dedicating a work to the careful analysis of a text from the other
-tradition.2 While the number of scholars who are doing work influenced
+tradition. While the number of scholars who are doing work influenced
 by both or which defies easy categorization is growing, there is still a great
 deal of mutual misunderstanding, distrust, and even hostility.
-Having studied both traditions and found genuine wisdom in both,
+**Having studied both traditions and found genuine wisdom in both,
-I consider this contemporary split detrimental to philosophy as a whole.
+I consider this contemporary split detrimental to philosophy as a whole.**
 We all specialize, but cutting oneself off a priori from an entire tradition
 is wasteful to the point of absurdity. Some believe that the other branch is
@@ Línea 56: / Línea 85: @@
 each other, if they ever were. Why put in the time and effort to understand
 the vocabulary and arguments of the other tradition if they have nothing
-to say about the issues one is interested in? Richard Rorty, perhaps the
+to say about the issues one is interested in? **Richard Rorty**, perhaps the
 thinker best known for finding common ground between the traditions,
 has said that he expects philosophy to split into two distinct disciplines with
@@ Línea 66: / Línea 95: @@
 should and I think will become as obsolete as what were once regarded
 as the urgent and inescapable decisions between rationalism or empiricism,
-Augustine or Aquinas, Plato or Aristotle. The better resolution of the
+**Augustine** or **Aquinas**, **Plato** or **Aristotle**. The better resolution of the
 situation is not mutual ignoring and ignorance, but a dialogue between
 the two branches in which each sifts through the resources of the other to
@@ Línea 83: / Línea 112: @@
 to views and practices that have been taken for granted.
-The project of this book is to demonstrate that there is at least one
+**The project of this book is to demonstrate that there is at least one
 important topic shared by both analytic and continental philosophy, and
-to analyze it in a newly created vocabulary. Interestingly, the topic that I
+to analyze it in a newly created vocabulary**. Interestingly, the topic that I
 believe can best initiate this twenty-first-century rapprochement comes
 from the same figure who solved the parallel problem in the eighteenth
-century: Immanuel Kant. In fact, the seed for the reconciliation can be
+century: **Immanuel Kant**. In fact, the seed for the reconciliation can be
 found in the very idea that forms the core of the //Critique of Pure Reason// and
 the linchpin of its rationalist-empiricist synthesis; namely, the idea that
@@ Línea 96: / Línea 125: @@
 forms an important thread of what has become known as anti-realism in
 analytic philosophy. It represents one of that tradition’s central topics and
-has been extensively discussed by such leading lights as Wittgenstein,
+has been extensively discussed by such leading lights as **Wittgenstein**,
-Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Goodman, and Dummett.5 Since Kant’s work
+**Quine**, **Davidson**, **Putnam**, **Goodman**, and **Dummett**. Since **Kant’s** work
 is the source of this idea and since he is certainly as influential on the continental
 tradition as on the analytic one, we should be able to find this core
 Kantian topic in the works of the great continental philosophers as well. If
-we can pierce the disparate vocabularies and styles to identify Kant’s idea
+we can pierce the disparate vocabularies and styles to identify **Kant’s** idea
 as seminal for both camps, we should be able to use it to bring about an
 informed dialogue and debate. To initiate such a dialogue, this book
@@ Línea 111: / Línea 140: @@
 vocabularies, interests, and approaches. This commonality should come
 as no surprise to anyone who believes that philosophy is deeply historical,
-since both traditions trace their lineage back to Kant, for whose epistemology
+since both traditions trace their lineage back to **Kant**, for whose epistemology
 and metaphysics this anti-realist idea was the central innovation.
@@ Línea 117: / Línea 146: @@
 camps as well as among the continental thinkers themselves (who tend to
 create their own terminology), I will use a set of theses derived from prominent
-analytic philosophers of anti-realism (particularly Putnam and Dummett)
+analytic philosophers of anti-realism (particularly **Putnam** and **Dummett**)
 to define realism and, by negation, to supply an initial orientation
 on anti-realism. The set of theses defining anti-realism will then get refined
 and varied as we survey the continental philosophers and examine
 the various ways they reject realism and modify the positions of their predecessors.
 I will call these sets of theses the Realism and Anti-Realism Matrices,
- and they will form a framework for a fine-grained analysis of the
+and they will form a framework for a fine-grained analysis of the
 interrelations among these prominent continental thinkers as well as the
 foundation for a cross-divisional dialogue. The framework traces the specific
-ways in which Hegel, Nietzsche, and early Heidegger each modify
+ways in which **Hegel**, **Nietzsche**, and early **Heidegger** each modify
 the position and problems of their predecessors, thus highlighting the
-fact that, as heirs of Kant’s revolution, the rejection of realism and the
+fact that, as heirs of **Kant’s** revolution, the rejection of realism and the
 construction of a superior alternative is a central issue for their work. I will
-then modify the framework to analyze later Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida,
+then modify the framework to analyze later **Heidegger**, **Foucault**, and **Derrida**,
 in order to show how they are still working in the wake of this issue.
-Examining continental thought through the lens of an analytic issue
+**Examining continental thought through the lens of an analytic issue
 (though one originating with Kant), as well as discussing these works in
-terms of theses, may concern some. The burden of proof, of course, rests
+terms of theses, may concern some.** The burden of proof, of course, rests
 with me to show that this topic can be found in the texts without procrustean
 readings and that my treatment of the texts is sensitive enough
@@ Línea 158: / Línea 187: @@
 the continental figures and texts that deal most directly with the topic
 of anti-realism, inevitably leaving out some quite important figures and
-movements (for example, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty,
+movements (for example, **Kierkegaard**, **Husserl**, **Deleuze**, **Merleau-Ponty**,
-Gadamer, the Frankfurt school, and structuralism). However, the figures
+**Gadamer**, the **Frankfurt school**, and **structuralism**). However, the figures
-I have chosen—Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida—
+I have chosen—**Kant**, **Hegel**, **Nietzsche**, **Heidegger**, **Foucault**, and **Derrida**—
 are widely considered the greatest thinkers of the continental tradition
 (with some argument over an inclusion or exclusion here or there,
@@ Línea 179: / Línea 208: @@
 on anti-realism imparts a surprisingly clear and intelligible structure to
 the last two centuries of philosophical thought. This book traces a fairly
-clean developmental arc from Kant to Derrida which strongly rejects the
+clean developmental arc from **Kant** to **Derrida** which strongly rejects the
 impression that their works come out of nowhere with no discernible relations
 to previous or later thinkers. On my reading, these thinkers have
@@ Línea 198: / Línea 227: @@
 My narrative describes the history of continental philosophy in two phases:
-the Kantian Paradigm and the Heideggerian Paradigm. Loosely following
+the **Kantian Paradigm** and the **Heideggerian Paradigm**. Loosely following
-Kuhn, I call them paradigms because each phase takes place within a broad
+**Kuhn**, I call them paradigms because each phase takes place within a broad
 framework of deep, organizing, orienting presuppositions that set the
 starting point, basic assumptions and outlook, and the issues of relevance
@@ Línea 208: / Línea 237: @@
 After defining realism by deriving and discussing a set of theses from
-prominent analytic philosophers in chapter 1, I will examine Kant’s partial
+prominent analytic philosophers in chapter 1, I will examine **Kant’s** partial
 rejection of realism through the lens of the Realism Matrix in chapter 2.
-Kant is of signal importance in the history of philosophy for his profound
+**Kant** is of signal importance in the history of philosophy for his profound
 rejection of realism and his creation of a powerful alternative that establishes
 a fundamentally new conception of the self, metaphysics, and epistemology.
-Kant conceives of the mind as actively organizing experience,
+**Kant** conceives of the mind as actively organizing experience,
 which entails a new aspect of reality—phenomena—and a new conception
 of truth—intersubjective “agreement,” that is, what is necessary to experience
 for creatures like us. These pieces fit together to form the Kantian
 Paradigm, which rules over continental philosophy for the next century
-and a half. Although he initiates anti-realism, Kant retains two key elements
+and a half. Although he initiates anti-realism, **Kant** retains two key elements
 of realism in his system. First, in order to secure the stability—that
 is, necessity and universality—of the knowledge organized by the subject,
 he has to make the experience-organizing faculties of the subject permanent
-and unchanging. Although it is no substantial object like Descartes’
+and unchanging. Although it is no substantial object like **Descartes**’
 thinking thing, this view still amounts to a vestigial realism of the subject.
 Second, in order to escape what he considers to be the incoherence of
 complete idealism, he posits mind-independent reality in noumena.
-In chapters 3 and 4, I show how both Hegel and Nietzsche work
+In chapters 3 and 4, I show how both **Hegel** and **Nietzsche** work
 within the Kantian Paradigm by accepting the basic anti-realist picture of
 the subject actively organizing experience, but chafe against the remnants
-of realism in Kant’s thought. Both reduce Kant’s realism of the subject by
+of realism in Kant’s thought. Both reduce **Kant’s** realism of the subject by
 introducing multiplicity into the subject’s experience-organizing faculties—
-for Hegel this multiplicity is historical, while Nietzsche views it as a
+for Hegel this multiplicity is historical, while **Nietzsche** views it as a
 matter of corporeal drives—and they also seek an escape from positing
 noumenal reality. Although they make significant advances and verge on
 breaking with the Kantian Paradigm, I will argue that neither succeeds in
-getting free of it. Hegel’s historical phases of consciousness end up getting
+getting free of it. **Hegel’s** historical phases of consciousness end up getting
-gathered into a definitive totality at the end of history, while Nietzsche’s
+gathered into a definitive totality at the end of history, while **Nietzsche’s**
 drives are all incarnations of will to power, both ideas imposing limitations
 on what the subject can be. Furthermore, their conceptions of truth—the
-whole for Hegel and the pragmatic increase of power for Nietzsche—
+whole for Hegel and the pragmatic increase of power for **Nietzsche**—
-push them back to realist remnants, since Hegel’s notion requires that
+push them back to realist remnants, since **Hegel’s** notion requires that
 there be a determinate whole, while Nietzsche needs at least a loose definition
 of power and what counts as increasing or decreasing it in order to
 evaluate various embodiments of will to power.
-Heidegger’s thought—particularly his Kehre, or the “turning” from
+**Heidegger’s** thought—particularly his Kehre, or the “turning” from
 his early to later periods—represents the turning point in my narrative
 of the history of continental philosophy. Chapter 5 shows how his early
 (roughly before 1930) work wrestles with the Kantian Paradigm as well as
-with Hegel and Nietzsche’s attempts to break free of it. His background in
+with **Hegel** and **Nietzsche’s** attempts to break free of it. His background in
 phenomenology means that he begins unburdened by a noumenal realm,
-a notion that Nietzsche flirted with and that Hegel laboriously worked his
+a notion that **Nietzsche** flirted with and that **Hegel** laboriously worked his
-way through. However, Heidegger’s notion of authenticity commits him
+way through. However, **Heidegger’s** notion of authenticity commits him
 to a univocal realist conception of subjectivity that actually represents a
-step backwards from Nietzsche’s multiple selves. In addition to phenomenological
+step backwards from **Nietzsche’s** multiple selves. In addition to phenomenological
 ontology which completely dispenses with the noumenal realm,
-Heidegger’s other early breakthrough is his conception of truth as unconcealment.
+**Heidegger’s** other early breakthrough is his conception of truth as unconcealment.
-Unlike Hegel and Nietzsche, Heidegger has a conception of
+Unlike **Hegel** and **Nietzsche**, **Heidegger** has a conception of
 truth that works with his ontology to lay the groundwork for a decisive break
-with the Kantian Paradigm. If truth is unconcealment, then Heidegger is
+with the Kantian Paradigm. If truth is unconcealment, then **Heidegger** is
 no longer sorting out false appearances from true reality; abandoning the
 reality-appearance distinction marks what he calls the end of metaphysics.
@@ Línea 266: / Línea 295: @@
 compromises the potential of these discoveries in his early work.
-Heidegger’s later thought marks the next major phase in continental
+**Heidegger’s** later thought marks the next major phase in continental
 philosophy, the first genuinely non-Kantian rather than just post-Kantian
 philosophy, as described in chapter 6. Here he follows through on the
@@ Línea 277: / Línea 306: @@
 can serve as an anchor or explanatory arche—not independent reality as
 in realism, not transcendental subjectivity as in Kantian anti-realism, and
-not Being. Later Heidegger maintains the anti-realist idea that beings and
+not Being. Later **Heidegger** maintains the anti-realist idea that beings and
 knowledge are organized around something like a conceptual scheme,
 but now he makes these schemes multiple “understandings of Being,” removing
@@ Línea 283: / Línea 312: @@
 reason or explanation.
-With his later work, Heidegger breaks free of Kant’s thought and
+With his later work, **Heidegger** breaks free of Kant’s thought and
 takes his place as the unavoidable thinker for those who follow, as is shown
-in chapter 7 by demonstrating in detail how Foucault’s thought works
+in chapter 7 by demonstrating in detail how **Foucault’s** thought works
-within the Heideggerian Paradigm. Foucault too immerses everything into
+within the Heideggerian Paradigm. **Foucault** too immerses everything into
 history, especially the subject. He also believes that beings, knowledge,
 and subjectivity are organized differently at particular times by impersonal
 schemes which he variously calls //epistemes//, apparatuses, or games of
-truth. Foucault’s more detailed examination of history and his focus on
+truth. **Foucault’s** more detailed examination of history and his focus on
 power and institutions in his genealogical phase make the epochal shifts
-more intelligible than Heidegger’s profoundly mysterious “sendings of
+more intelligible than **Heidegger’s** profoundly mysterious “sendings of
-Being,” but they too quickly reach a limit of explication. Heidegger’s influence
+Being,” but they too quickly reach a limit of explication. **Heidegger’s** influence
-on Foucault, as well as Foucault’s criticisms of Heidegger, are an
+on **Foucault**, as well as **Foucault’s** criticisms of **Heidegger**, are an
 extremely important topic which has received considerably less attention
 in the secondary literature than it deserves.
-Finally I turn to Derrida, perhaps the most controversial and important
+Finally I turn to **Derrida**, perhaps the most controversial and important
-continental philosopher after Heidegger. Derrida makes the dismantling
+continental philosopher after **Heidegger**. **Derrida** makes the dismantling
 of realism, what he calls the metaphysics of presence, a cornerstone
 of his thought, and he takes over many Heideggerian Paradigm
 tools to accomplish this. However, he is also extremely sensitive to just how
-difficult it is to escape metaphysics; Heidegger himself, in his estimation,
+difficult it is to escape metaphysics; **Heidegger** himself, in his estimation,
 is the greatest thinker of this escape, while still being mired in metaphysics.
-Ironically, it is Heidegger’s very attempt to go outside of the history
+Ironically, it is **Heidegger’s** very attempt to go outside of the history
-of metaphysics that locks him most firmly inside of it. In this way, Derrida’s
+of metaphysics that locks him most firmly inside of it. In this way, **Derrida’s**
-relationship to Heidegger resembles Heidegger’s relationship to
+relationship to **Heidegger** resembles **Heidegger’s** relationship to
-Kant: the earlier figure opened up essential new lines of thought, but remained
+**Kant**: the earlier figure opened up essential new lines of thought, but remained
 fatally compromised by the very movement he sought to overcome.
 Derrida points the way to a new paradigm by recasting the idea of
 conceptual schemes as deeply unstable, and paradoxically succeeds in
 escaping metaphysics by problematizing the very idea of escape. These
-views effect profound changes across many issues, making Derrida’s work
+views effect profound changes across many issues, making **Derrida’s** work
 disorienting and stunningly original, while at the same time fitting quite
 well into the two-hundred-year-long conversation I am sketching.
@@ Línea 322: / Línea 351: @@
 each thinker is responding to problems bequeathed him and is working
 on an inherited framework from within. In particular, we learn just how
-long Kant’s shadow was. In fact, we can almost say of Kant what Nietzsche
+long **Kant’s** shadow was. In fact, we can almost say of Kant what **Nietzsche**
 says of God, that he “is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be
 caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.—And
 we—we still have to vanquish his shadow” (Nietzsche, GS 108). In my
-reading, the century and a half following Kant was spent vanquishing his
+reading, the century and a half following **Kant** was spent vanquishing his
 shadows. The major philosophers in his wake rejected his thought but still
-retained vestiges of it even in their attacks on it. I show how Hegel, Nietzsche,
+retained vestiges of it even in their attacks on it. I show how **Hegel**, **Nietzsche**,
-and early Heidegger all subscribe to important aspects of Kant’s system
+and early **Heidegger** all subscribe to important aspects of **Kant’s** system
 while trying to surpass it.
 The second lesson derived from this analysis is the significance and
-importance of Heidegger’s later work. One of the most difficult and disorienting
+importance of **Heidegger’s** later work. One of the most difficult and disorienting
 bodies of work in the canon, it has long served as a paradigm of
 unapproachable incomprehensibility to many. I will locate it in relation to
@@ Línea 341: / Línea 370: @@
 that have guided thought for centuries—then it should appear strange to
 us. This history of continental anti-realism gives us a new way to understand
-the Kehre as the change from a thinker still fighting Kant’s shadow
+the Kehre as the change from a thinker still fighting **Kant’s** shadow
-to one who has broken free and taken his place, and makes Heidegger’s
+to one who has broken free and taken his place, and makes **Heidegger’s**
 enormous influence on continental thinkers understandable. It also makes
 him more important and, I hope, comprehensible to analytic philosophy.
-Although the early work of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger has been assimilated
+Although the early work of **Hegel**, **Nietzsche**, and **Heidegger** has been assimilated
-by analytic philosophers to varying degrees, Heidegger’s later
+by analytic philosophers to varying degrees, **Heidegger’s** later
 work remains terra incognita. If my narrative is correct, this body of work
 contains radically new insights into some of the basic problems of antirealism
 and related issues. Whether they end up agreeing with this or not,
 analytic philosophers working on anti-realism could benefit enormously
-from his thought, and continental thinkers working on Heidegger should
+from his thought, and continental thinkers working on **Heidegger** should
 have the opportunity to hear their informed criticisms and suggestions.

filosofias.es

Herramientas de usuario

Herramientas del sitio

Diferencias

Herramientas de la página